AzerbaijanCountry Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2006 Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor March 6, 2007
Azerbaijan is a republic of approximately 7.9 million
persons with a presidential form of government. The president dominated
the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. Ilham
Aliyev, the son of former president Heydar Aliyev, was elected president
in 2003 in a ballot that did not meet international standards for a
democratic election due to numerous, serious irregularities. November 2005
parliamentary elections, including rerun elections in ten constituencies
in May, showed an improvement in some areas but did not meet a number of
international standards. Armenian forces controlled most of
Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as large portions of adjacent Azerbaijani
territory. The government did not exercise any control over developments
in territories occupied by Armenian forces. Civilian authorities generally
maintained effective control of the security forces. Members of the
security forces committed numerous human rights abuses. The government's human rights record remained poor, and it
continued to commit numerous abuses. The public's right to peacefully
change the national legislature was restricted in the November 2005
parliamentary elections, although there were some improvements in the
period leading up to the elections and in the May 13 parliamentary
election reruns that took place in ten parliamentary constituencies.
Torture and beating of persons in police custody resulted in three deaths,
and police officials acted with impunity. Prison conditions--despite
improvements in infrastructure--were generally harsh and life threatening.
Arbitrary arrest and detention, particularly of individuals considered by
the government to be political opponents, and lengthy pretrial detention
continued. The government continued to imprison persons for politically
motivated reasons. Pervasive corruption in the judiciary and in law
enforcement continued. Restrictions on media freedom, freedom of assembly,
and political participation worsened. During the year, the government took several important steps
to combat human trafficking, including establishing a shelter for victims
of trafficking, and separating the antitrafficking special police unit
from the organized crime unit. RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom From: a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life The government or its agents did not commit any politically
motivated killings; however, human rights monitors reported three
prisoners died in police custody due to alleged abuse and mistreatment.
On April 3, Namik Mammadov died in police custody at the
Khizi regional police department. Domestic human rights activists reported
that police beat and tortured him during questioning in order to coerce a
confession. Police officials initially alleged that Mammadov died of a
heart attack. However, photographic evidence of torture resulted in the
state prosecutor opening a criminal investigation into Mammadov's death.
Following the investigation, officials asserted the death was a suicide.
On July 25, Rasim Alishov died while in the custody of the
Mingechevir city police; human rights activists reported that Alishov was
beaten and tortured to death. In response the interior minister dismissed
the head of the investigations department of the Mingechevir police and a
member of the investigations staff and reprimanded three other Mingechevir
officers in August. On September 16, Yuri Safaraliyev was found dead in a
Gobustan prison bathroom. The government attributed Safaraliyev's death to
suicide. On August 29, Alihuseyn Shaliyev, a former ministry of
economic development official in pretrial detention, was found dead at a
Ministry of Justice hospital. Shaliyev had been arrested in October 2005
in connection with an alleged coup plot (see section 1.d.). A ministry
investigation concluded that Shaliyev committed suicide by repeatedly
slashing himself with a razor blade, an assessment with which human rights
monitors concurred. The authorities did not prosecute law enforcement officials
implicated in the 2005 deaths of Nikolay Nikolashvili, Elchin Shahmaliyev,
Elhman Ibrahimov, and Mahir Suleymanov because the government attributed
these deaths to suicide. In March 2005 the ministry of national security arrested a
senior Ministry of Internal Affairs official, Haji Mammadov, for ordering
the kidnapping of 11 persons and killing of three persons since 1995 as
the head of a criminal kidnapping, murder, and extortion ring within the
ministry of internal affairs (see section 1.b.). Mammadov's trial began in
June, received widespread publicity, and continued at year's end. In 2005 unknown persons killed journalist Elmar Huseynov
(see section 2.a.). Human rights activists reported that Orkhan Nasibov, an army
soldier, died on July 23 as a result of military hazing. It was not known
whether military officials were investigated in connection with this
allegation. Armenia continued to occupy the Azerbaijani territory of
Nagorno-Karabakh and seven surrounding Azerbaijani territories. During the
year, incidents along the militarized line of contact separating the sides
as a result of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict again resulted in numerous
casualties on both sides. Reporting from unofficial sources indicated
approximately 20 killed and 44 wounded, taking into account both military
and civilian casualties on both sides of the line of contact. According to the national agency for mine actions, landmines
killed two persons and injured 15 others during the year. b. Disappearance During the year there were at least two reports of
politically motivated kidnappings. On March 6 unknown assailants kidnapped
opposition newspaper journalist Fikret Huseynli and on September 30 the
father of Eynulla Fatullayev, founder of Azerbaijan's most widely read
weekly newsmagazine (see section 2.a.). In March 2005 the wife of the chairman of the International
Bank of Azerbaijan was kidnapped. A ministry of national security
investigation uncovered a kidnapping and extortion ring responsible for
the woman's kidnapping, as well as multiple killings over a 10-year period
directed from within the ministry of internal affairs. A ministry of
national security special forces unit raid rescued the woman (see section
1.a.). The prosecutor general prosecuted one senior ministry of
internal affairs officer, Lieutenant Colonel Haji Mammadov, chief of the
ministry's criminal investigation division, who confessed to the March
kidnapping and also to the abduction of 11 persons since 1995. The
ministry of national security arrested 12 persons for their involvement in
the ring, including two Chechen citizens. The minister of internal
affairs, who remained in office, dismissed three other senior ministry
officials including the Deputy Minister for Law Enforcement Zahid
Dunyamaliyev. The ministry of justice did not prosecute these officials.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
continued to urge the government to provide information on the fate of
persons missing in action since the beginning of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict; during the year the number of those confirmed missing increased
from 3,400 to 4,176. The government estimated that approximately 4,850
citizens remained missing, allegedly held by Armenia. During the year the
ICRC facilitated the transfer and repatriation of six persons between
Armenia and Azerbaijan. c. Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment The constitution and law prohibit such practices and provide
for penalties of up to 10 years' imprisonment; however, there were
credible reports that security forces beat detainees to extract
confessions. Despite defendants' claims that testimony was obtained
through torture or abuse, no cases involving such claims were dismissed. A
domestic human rights monitor reported that security forces tortured
between 40 and 50 persons while in custody. For example, according to the
monitor, police in a Mingechevir police station tied up a detainee and
beat him unconscious. Impunity remained a problem. In November 2005 the media reported that officers of the
ministry of internal affairs organized crime unit repeatedly gave electric
shocks to opposition Azerbaijan Democratic Party (ADP) deputy chairman and
former political prisoner Natik Efendiyev while in detention (see section
1.d.). Following widespread attention from press, local nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), and international observers, the ministry
transferred Efendiyev from the organized crime unit to a local prison
where he received medical treatment. In September he was sentenced to five
years in prison (see section 1.e.). According to the ministry of internal affairs, authorities
punished 104 officers for human rights abuses. However, the ministry did
not state whether the government criminally charged any police officers
for these violations. The ministry reported that it dismissed 28 law
enforcement officers for misconduct during the year. During the year the government did not punish interior
ministry officials for police abuse, misconduct, and the excessive use of
force at a November 2005 peaceful opposition demonstration nor was any
action expected. Viliyat Eyvazov, one of the senior officers allegedly
involved in police abuse and misconduct in the aftermath of the 2003
presidential election, continued to serve as deputy minister of internal
affairs following his 2005 promotion. Prison and Detention Center Conditions Prison conditions remained harsh and life threatening
despite continuing prison infrastructure improvements. Overcrowding, inadequate nutrition, and poor medical care
combined to make the spread of infectious diseases a serious problem.
Despite recent improvements to prison infrastructure, prisons, generally
Soviet-era facilities, did not meet international standards. In
maximum-security facilities, authorities limited physical exercise for
prisoners as well as visits by attorneys and family members. Some pretrial
detainees were reportedly held in "separation cells," often located in
basements, to conceal evidence of physical abuse and where food and sleep
reportedly were denied to elicit confessions. According to the justice ministry, three new detention
facilities, built to meet international standards, were under construction
in the regions of Sheki, Lenkoran and Nakchivan. The government increased
financing for prison renovations threefold during the year and completed
renovations at 16 facilities. Harsh prison conditions resulted in numerous deaths during
the year; the total number of prison deaths was not available from the
justice ministry at year's end. Credible reports indicated that at least
three deaths in police detention facilities were the result of torture or
abuse (see section 1.a.). Tuberculosis (TB) remained the primary cause of
death in prisons; the government reported 633 convicts received treatment
for TB. The ICRC reported the government treated 674 prisoners for TB
during the year; due to the absence of systematic medical screening, such
treatment often started after prisoners were seriously ill. The ICRC reported that 53 inmates died of the disease during
the year. In October the justice ministry launched an expanded TB
treatment program in its detention facilities. Many relied on their
families for medicine and food, who often paid bribes to prison officials
to gain access to imprisoned relatives. The government said that it
received no complaints of corruption within the prison system. In September a reconstituted joint government-human rights
community prison-monitoring group began functioning, although it was not
very active during the last three months of the year. The government had
disbanded the monitoring group following the February 2005 dismissal of
the deputy minister of justice for prisons on allegations of accepting
bribes for awarding prison renovation contracts, and it officially
reestablished the group in August 2005. The government permitted prison visits by international and
local humanitarian and human rights groups. The ICRC also had unobstructed
access to prisoners of war and to civilians held in connection with the
conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. In August 2005 the government authorized a
select group of local human rights activists to visit interior
ministry-run police stations and ministry pretrial detention facilities in
addition to prisons. This access continued uninterrupted during the year.
d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention Although the law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention,
the government generally did not observe these prohibitions in practice,
and impunity remained a problem. Role of the Police and Security Apparatus The ministry of internal affairs and ministry of national
security are responsible for internal security and report directly to the
president. The internal affairs ministry oversees local police forces and
maintains internal civil defense troops. The ministry of national security
has a separate internal security force. Law enforcement corruption was a problem. Police often
levied spurious, informal fines for traffic and other minor violations and
extracted protection money from local residents. In 2005 and again during
the year, traffic police officers received a substantial pay raise to
counter corruption; nevertheless, the low wages of other law enforcement
officials continued to contribute to police corruption. The ministry of
internal affairs reported that during the year it punished 45 police
officers for corruption. Police officers acted with impunity, and in most cases the
government took little or no disciplinary action. During the year,
however, the government reported that it took action against 104 police
officers for human rights violations, seven of whom were disciplined for
inflicting bodily harm. The government reported that it dismissed 28
officers from the ministry of internal affairs police forces, removed six
officers from their position and administratively disciplined 11 others.
The government did not state whether it criminally charged any officers
for violating human rights and civil liberties during the year. During the year an international foundation continued its
training program in human rights theory, standards, and practices for
security officers attached to the Special State Protective Service (SSPS),
a government agency responsible for protecting the Baku‑Tbilisi-Ceyhan
pipeline. The officers who participated in the training were recruited
from the SSPS, state border guard, army, and police. During the year an international organization conducted
community policing and crowd control training for 135 ministry of internal
affairs police officers. In May 2005 the justice ministry granted approval
for foreign governments to train law enforcement officials to meet
international standards and the first training program began. Arrest and Detention The law states that persons who are detained, arrested, or
accused of a crime should be advised immediately of their rights and
reason for arrest and accorded due process of law; however, the government
did not respect these provisions in practice. Arbitrary arrest, often on
spurious charges of resisting the police, remained a problem throughout
the year. The law allows police to detain and question individuals for
24 hours without a warrant; in practice police detained individuals for
several days, sometimes weeks, without a warrant. In other instances, the
prosecutor general issued ex post facto warrants. Judges, acting at the instruction of the prosecutor
general's office or of other executive branch officials, sentenced
detainees to jail within hours of their arrest without providing access to
a lawyer. The law provides for access to a lawyer from the time of
detention; in practice, access to lawyers was poor, particularly outside
of Baku. Although provided for by law, in practice indigent detainees did
not have access to lawyers. Authorities often restricted family member
visits and withheld information about detainees; frequently days passed
before families could obtain any information about detained relatives.
Individuals were sometimes permitted to "vouch" for detainees, enabling
their conditional release during pretrial investigation; however, there
was no formal, functioning bail system. At times politically sensitive
suspects were held incommunicado for several hours and sometimes days
while in police custody. On October 11, immigration inspectors at Baku's
international airport detained opposition youth activist and media freedom
advocate Emin Huseynov on his arrival from Turkey, releasing him after
five hours. Huseynov, who featured prominently in a BBC television
documentary about the country's 2005 parliamentary elections, complained
that authorities also subjected his family to harassment. On October 18, police detained overnight Ali Ismayilov, the
leader of the youth group Yox. The detention prevented Ismayilov's
participation in an unauthorized rally in Baku's city center on October 19
(see section 2.b.). On November 23, police officers detained 40 to 50 opposition
party members attempting to hold an unsanctioned protest in front of the
Baku mayor's office. Observers reported that police detained at least
three opposition members before the protest began as they exited a local
metro station. Immediately following their arrest, a Baku court fined some
of the detainees and sentenced 16 others to detention for between two and
15 days. Credible reports indicated that the court proceedings failed to
meet minimum standards for due process. For example, the detainees did not
have access to legal counsel during the hearing and were not formally
arraigned on a specific charge. Witnesses report that some of the
detainees received their sentences while waiting in the police bus outside
of the courtroom. All of the detainees were released at the end of their
respective detention periods. In the run-up to the 2005 parliamentary elections, ministry
of internal affairs police officers preemptively detained members of the
political opposition to prevent their participation in planned but
unsanctioned political rallies, on grounds that they were suspected of
planning to incite civil unrest. Within hours of the detentions, judges
sentenced the individuals to jail on those grounds. Between June 4, when
the government partially restored freedom of assembly, and November 6,
election day, the government detained and sentenced 50 persons for
attempting to participate in unauthorized rallies. Lengthy pretrial detention of up to 18 months was a serious
problem. The prosecutor general routinely extended the permitted, initial
three-month pretrial detention period in successive increments of several
months until the government completed an investigation. In October 2005 security forces arrested approximately 300
opposition party activists, including up to 20 parliamentary candidates,
in connection with the anticipated return to Baku of exiled ADP leader
Rasul Guliyev. Shortly thereafter in October the ministry of national
security arrested presidential aide Akif Muradverdiyev, Minister of Health
Ali Insanov, Minister of Economic Development Farhad Aliyev, former
finance minister Fikrat Yusifov, business leaders Fikrat Sadigov and Rafiq
Aliyev, and others, including Ministry of Economic Development official
Alihuseyn Shaliyev (see section 1.a.), for allegedly attempting to foment
a coup d'etat in connection with Guliyev's failed October return. As of
year's end, authorities had not presented any evidence to substantiate
this charge and eight persons remained in pretrial detention. The law
permits individuals charged with fomenting a coup to be held in pretrial
detention for up to 18 months if the prosecutor general's office states to
a court that continued detention is justified for the investigation; this
period would expire in April 2007. The trial of Natik Efendiyev, an ADP
deputy chairman charged with aiding and abetting the coup plot, occurred
in September (see sections 1.e. and 1.c.). In November 2005 government agents arrested prominent
academic and Guliyev friend Eldar Salayev for allegedly planning to carry
out the coup. The national security ministry released Salayev from
detention in 2005 on account of his age and poor health, although the
charges against him continued to stand. In November 2005 several progovernment television channels
broadcast a videotape of ministry of national security detainees Yusifov,
Insanov, Muradverdiyev, and Sadigov testifying to their role in the plot
to overthrow the government. Yusifov, a former finance minister whose
testimony dominated the broadcast, described himself as the financial
middleman in exiled opposition leader Guliyev's network of support within
the government and business community. Yusifov confessed that Aliyev,
Insanov, Sadigov, and others gave him money, which he turned over to
Salayev, who was tasked with financing the opposition's activities. In
November 2005 authorities released Fikrat Sadiqov, former head of a
state-owned chemical company, on the condition he notify police before
traveling outside of Baku. NGOs and lawyers for several of the accused reported that
some of the detainees did not have access to appropriate medical care.
They also said that the government denied the detainees' due process
rights, inappropriately prolonged the pretrial detention period, and
denied some detainees the right to visits by their families. Some NGOs
considered the case of the alleged coup plotters to be politically
motivated. The police arrested and detained members of certain
religious groups, generally evangelical Christian denominations (see
section 2.c.). Amnesty During the year President Aliyev pardoned 199 prisoners,
including eight persons whom local human rights activists considered
political prisoners. Aliyev's October 24 decree included two journalists
imprisoned in August on libel charges. Although the law provides for an independent judiciary, in
practice judges did not function independently of the executive branch.
The judiciary was corrupt and inefficient. The executive branch exerts a strong influence over the
judiciary. The president appoints Supreme Court and Constitutional Court
judges (subject to parliamentary confirmation) and lower court judges
(without parliamentary confirmation). Judges' salaries steadily increased over several years;
nevertheless, there continued to be credible allegations that judges
routinely accepted bribes. There were also credible reports that judges
and prosecutors took instruction from the presidential administration and
the justice ministry, particularly in cases of interest to international
observers. Courts of general jurisdiction may hear criminal, civil, and
juvenile cases. District courts try the majority of cases. The Supreme
Court may not act as the court of first instance. One judge presides over
district court-level trials, while a three-judge panel hears cases at the
Court of Appeals, the Court of Grave Crimes, and the Supreme Court. The
constitution provides all citizens with the right to appeal to the
Constitutional Court. Citizens also have the right to appeal to the
European Court of Human Rights, and they exercised this right frequently.
On October 2005 the justice ministry for the first time
granted approval to an international NGO to train judges on compliance
with election law. This judicial training program continued throughout the
year. Trial Procedures The law provides for public trials except in cases involving
state, commercial, or professional secrets or matters involving
confidential, personal, or family matters. The law provides for the
presumption of innocence in criminal cases, the right to review evidence,
a defendant's rights to confront witnesses and present evidence at trial,
a court-approved attorney for indigent defendants, and appeal for both
defendants and prosecutors--provisions not generally respected in
practice. Plans to begin jury trials were not implemented. Foreign and
domestic observers usually were allowed to attend trials. Although the
constitution prescribes equal status for prosecutors and defense
attorneys, in practice prosecutors' privileges and rights outweighed those
of the defense. Judges reserved the right to remove defense lawyers in
civil cases for "good cause." In criminal proceedings judges may remove
defense lawyers for conflict of interest or if a defendant requests a
change of counsel. The law limits representation in criminal cases to members
of a government-controlled collegium of lawyers (bar association), thereby
restricting the public's access to legal representation of choice. The
collegium reserves the right to remove lawyers from criminal cases and
sometimes did so for reasons that observers believed were questionable.
The law allows all licensed lawyers to join the collegium automatically.
However, some provisions in the law left open the possibility that the
collegium could refuse a fully qualified lawyer for failing to meet other,
unspecified requirements. In 2005 the collegium admitted nine of 231
licensed lawyers entitled to automatic admission to the association.
During the year the collegium did not admit any licensed lawyers to the
organization. In June the collegium announced plans to hold a bar
examination to admit additional lawyers to the collegium, but did not hold
the examinations during the year. The constitution prohibits the use of illegally obtained
evidence; however, despite some defendants' claims that testimony was
obtained through torture or abuse, no cases based on claims of abuse were
dismissed, and there was no independent forensic investigator to determine
the occurrence of abuse (see section 1.c.). Investigations often focused
on obtaining confessions rather than gathering physical evidence against
suspects. Serious crimes brought before the courts were likely to end in
conviction, as judges generally required only a minimal level of proof and
collaborated closely with prosecutors. In the rare instance when a judge
determined the evidence presented was not sufficient to convict a
defendant, judges could and did return cases to the prosecutor for
additional investigation, in effect giving the prosecution a "second
chance" for a conviction. On September 6, Natik Efendiyev was tried on charges of
stockpiling weapons in connection with an alleged October 2005 coup plot
(see section 1.d.). After a two-day trial, Efendiyev was sentenced to five
years in prison. No domestic or international human rights monitors were
present at the trial because of its sudden occurrence and remote location.
An appellate court upheld the conviction in November. Efendiyev reportedly
was tortured in pretrial detention (see section 1.c.). Some NGOs
considered the imprisonment of Natik Efendiyev to be politically
motivated. In September Musavat party member Pirali Orujev, arrested in
June 2005, was sentenced to four years' imprisonment for allegedly
conspiring to kill two progovernment figures. Some NGOs raised concerns
about the fairness of his trial and considered his imprisonment to be
politically motivated. On November 23, a Baku court sentenced 27 opposition members
to jail for periods of up to two weeks for participating in an
unauthorized protest outside of the Baku mayor's office earlier that day
(see section 1.b.). Similarly, in the period preceding the November 2005
parliamentary elections, judges often sentenced to jail opposition members
arrested for participating in unauthorized political rallies within hours
of their detention and without a fair trial. The country also has a military court system with civilian
judges. The military court retains original jurisdiction over any case in
which "crimes against the state" are adjudicated. Political Prisoners and Detainees Local NGOs maintained that the government continued to hold
political prisoners, although estimates of the number varied. NGO
activists maintained that the government held approximately 51 political
prisoners. As was the case in 2005, at year's end three political
prisoners arrested in connection with the 2003 presidential election and
listed in the Council of Europe's experts report remained incarcerated:
Elchin Amiraslanov, Safa Poladov, and Arif Kazimov. From April 5 to July 12 the trial of Ruslan Bashirli, Said
Nuriyev, and Ramin Tagiyev, activists from the opposition youth group Yeni
Fikir took place in the Court of Grave Crimes. In August 2005 the
government arrested the activists and charged them with treason in the
period leading up to the 2005 parliamentary elections. In a widely
broadcast videotape shown by state-operated AzTV in 2005, Bashirli was
shown taking money from and conspiring with Georgian and alleged Armenian
citizens to foment revolution in the country. International and domestic
observers doubted the credibility of the evidence against the three
activists and suspected a case of entrapment to intimidate and embarrass
the opposition. Authorities asserted that national security justified
closure of the Yeni Fikir trial to outside observers during its first
three weeks. After the trial was opened to observers, diplomatic
representatives attended the proceedings and reported that the trial did
not meet minimum international standards for due process. The defendants
were repeatedly denied access to the evidence presented against them, the
cross-examination of witnesses was restricted, and the judge, Tofiq
Pashayev, often convened hearings for less than an hour before adjourning
the court proceeding for several weeks. As a result, domestic and
international observers considered the imprisonment of Bashirli, Nuriyev,
and Tagiyev to be politically motivated. On July 13, the court sentenced Bashirli to five years in
prison, Tagiyev to four years in prison, and Nuriyev to a suspended
three-year sentence because of a pre-existing health condition. On
September 28, an appeals court upheld the lower court's verdict but
reduced Tagiyev's sentence to three years. Domestic and international observers considered the
imprisonment of prominent political satirist Mirza Zahidov to be
politically motivated (see section 2.a.). Some NGOs considered several other cases involving prisoners
or detainees to be politically motivated (see sections 1.d. and 1.e.,
Trial Procedures). There were no reliable estimates of the number of political
detainees. Most political detainees received sentences of between 10 and
15 days in jail, often described as "administrative detention" sentences
(see sections 1.e., Trial Procedures and 2.b.). The government generally permitted unrestricted access to
political prisoners by international humanitarian organizations. f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence The law prohibits arbitrary invasions of privacy and
monitoring of correspondence and other private communications; in practice
the government restricted privacy rights. The constitution allows for searches of residences only with
a court order or in cases specifically provided by law; however,
authorities often conducted searches without warrants. It was widely
believed that the ministry of national security and ministry of internal
affairs monitored telephone and Internet communications, particularly
those of foreigners and prominent political and business figures. Police continued to intimidate and harass family members of
suspected criminals. Human rights monitors reported that officials denied
family members the right to visit those detained in connection with an
alleged coup plot (see section 1.d.). Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including: a. Freedom of Speech and Press The law provides for freedom of speech and of the press and
specifically prohibits press censorship; however, the government often did
not respect these rights in practice. On October 11, the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) representative on freedom of the
media visited the country in response to growing concern about the
deterioration of media freedom. The representative criticized the general
decline in media freedom during the year. He urged the president to pardon
journalists convicted of libel, to remove libel from the criminal code,
and to thoroughly investigate and prosecute physical assaults of
journalists. A large number of opposition and independent media outlets
operated during the year. The print media expressed a wide variety of
views on government policies. However, most broadcast media adhered to a
progovernment line in their news coverage. There were several pro-opposition newspapers and magazines,
and a few independent newspapers and magazines. There were 17 television
and 12 radio stations. There also were several national state newspapers
and numerous newspapers funded by city or district level officials. In
contrast to progovernment newspapers, the distribution of many opposition
newspapers was limited to the capital, and their circulation was low.
During the year many opposition and government-run newspapers reduced
circulation, and several, including prominent opposition newspaper Yeni
Musavat, reduced frequency. Moderate independent newspapers Echo and
Zerkalo, however, maintained their circulation. Some private television channels broadcast the views of both
government and opposition officials, but their programs were not available
in all parts of the country. ANS TV, a popular channel regarded as
independent, provided generally balanced news coverage. However, on
November 24, the National Television and Radio Council (NTRC) ordered ANS
to stop broadcasting on grounds that the channel had failed to comply with
national media law and regulations, a charge that ANS disputed. Citing the
appeals of prominent citizens, and of the human rights ombudswoman, the
NTRC reversed its decision on December 11 and allowed ANS to resume
broadcasting the following day. However, according to the NTRC, numerous
regulatory issues remained unresolved and at year's end, ANS had reapplied
for its license in an open tender. There were no restrictions on systems to receive satellite
broadcasts by foreign stations. Harassment and violence against individual journalists
continued. The Media Council, an independent NGO, reported that 40
journalists experienced physical attack or harassment during the six-month
period preceding the November 2005 parliamentary elections, the most
recent period for which data was available. On March 5, unknown assailants kidnapped opposition
newspaper journalist Fikret Huseynli and attacked him with a knife. No one
had been charged or arrested in connection with the incident by year's
end. On May 18, unknown assailants took Bahaddin Haziyev, editor
in chief of the opposition newspaper Bizim Yol (Our Path), to a lake near
Baku, ran his legs over with a car, and reportedly threatened to kill his
family if he did not stop writing articles critical of the government.
Huseynli sustained serious injuries. Authorities had not charged any
suspects in connection with the attack by year's end. On June 23, police arrested prominent political satirist
Mirza Zahidov (also known as Mirza Sakit) on charges of narcotics
trafficking and possession. Zahidov routinely criticized the government
and public officials in his writings. Human rights activists doubted the
credibility of the charges against Zahidov and considered them to be
politically motivated. On October 3 the Baku Court of Grave Crimes
convicted Zahidov of drug possession but not of drug trafficking. The
court sentenced Zahidov to three years in prison. In November, a Baku
appellate court upheld the sentence. On October 3, the Russian language weekly newsmagazine
Realny Azerbaijan and its Azerbaijani-language sister publication Gundelik
Azerbaijan abruptly ceased publication. Credible human rights monitors
said that unknown assailants kidnapped the father of the publications'
founder and editor in chief, Eynulla Fatullayev, and held him for three
days. Fatullayev's father was released reportedly after Fatullayev agreed
to cease publishing both titles on October 3. Fatullayev had started
Realny Azerbaijan in May 2005 after having worked at The Monitor, which
ceased publication following the killing of its founder and editor. In
2004 unknown assailants had physically attacked Fatullayev. Fatullayev
resumed the publication of Realny Azerbaijan in December. On November 24, the Baku Economic Court ordered the eviction
of the opposition Popular Front Party (PFP), the opposition-affiliated
newspapers Azadliq and Bizim Yol, and the independent Turan News Agency
from their headquarters in central Baku. The court ruled that the PFP and
the affected media organizations were occupying a building illegally
leased to them by the Baku mayor's office in 1992. Officials began
implementing the eviction order immediately after the verdict. Officials
gave the building tenants until 11:00 a.m. on November 25 to remove their
belongings and instructed the building's tenants to relocate to properties
that the government previously offered but which the tenants had rejected
as unacceptable due to their remote location and deplorable condition.
On November 25, police officers cordoned off access to the
building and local officials supervised hired movers who removed the
tenants' furniture, equipment and effects to the alternate locations.
However, police did not permit PFP workers to move the party's belongings
to a preferred temporary office at the ADP's headquarters. The opposition
newspapers Azadliq and Bizim Yol completed the relocation after one week
and resumed publication. The independent Turan News Agency relocated to a
downtown Baku facility within three days of the eviction and resumed its
full operations within a week. On December 25, four unidentified assailants attacked
opposition Azadliq newspaper journalist Nijat Huseynov near a bus stop
close to his home. Huseynov was hospitalized and in recovery at year's
end. There were no developments during the year in the March 2005
killing of the founder and editor of The Monitor, Elmar Huseynov, by
unknown assailants. The government characterized the killing as a
terrorist act meant to destabilize the regime and launched an
investigation into the case. Some human rights activists described the
killing as a warning to those critical of the government, a suggestion
that officials vehemently rejected. In July 2005 press reports stated that
the government's investigation identified two Georgian citizens, Tahir
Khubanov and Teymuraz Aliyev, as suspects. However, Ministry of Internal
Affairs Lieutenant Colonel Haji Mammadov asserted during his trial (see
section 1.b.) that he had ordered the killing of Huseynov at the order of
former minister of economic development Farhad Aliyev (see section 1.d.).
Members of the human rights and independent media communities did not find
this assertion credible. The Monitor ceased publication in April 2005.
In contrast with 2005, there were fewer reports that police
beat journalists covering opposition rallies or other events because
authorities did not permit opposition political rallies during the year.
In 2005 police officers beat some journalists and detained and released
others covering opposition rallies connected with the parliamentary
elections. A state regulatory agency, the NTRC, was responsible for
issuing licenses and monitoring broadcasts, but it did not function
independently of the government and its procedures were not transparent.
The justice ministry must register a corporation such as a television
station operating company in order for it to have legal existence. Despite
pressure from independent media outlets, the NTRC did not open tenders for
the issuance of new broadcast licenses during the year. Throughout the year, the NTRC failed to renew the broadcast
license of independent private broadcasting company ANS Television and
Radio, forcing it to operate without an official license since its license
expired in September 2005. During the year, ANS was also the subject of
multiple official investigations, including one for alleged tax evasion.
In October the NTRC notified ANS and the independent radio
station, AntennFM Radio, that the stations' daily broadcast of Voice of
America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and BBC-contracted programming
violated the national television and radio law. The NTRC asserted that the
law prohibited foreign broadcasters from rebroadcasting programming on
private television channels. In December the NTRC granted Voice of America
and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty their own FM radio frequencies and
notified Voice of America that it would be able to resume broadcasting on
state television on January 1, 2007. On November 24, the NTRC ordered ANS Television and Radio to
stop broadcasting at 3:00 p.m. that day. The NTRC said that ANS had 11
violations of the national media law and NTRC regulations. ANS disputed
the NTRC's claim, and company officials said that ANS complied with all of
the NTRC's regulatory orders during the year. Senior government officials
said that ANS could resume broadcasting if and when the company complied
with the NTRC's requirements. Citing the appeals of prominent citizens,
the NTRC reversed its decision on December 11 and allowed ANS to resume
broadcasting the following day. However, according to the NTRC, numerous
regulatory issues remained unresolved at year's end. ANS was also required
to compete in an open tender for its broadcast frequency, the results of
which were not yet known at year's end. In September 2005 the justice ministry initially rejected
the registration application of a regional television network consisting
of local stations on the grounds that the network was sponsored by an
international media development NGO. The network revised its incorporation
documents to remove the international NGO from the title. However, the
ministry did not act on the pending network registration application
during the year. Libel is a criminal offense; the law allows for large fines
and up to three years' imprisonment. The government intimidated and
harassed the media, primarily through defamation suits, prohibitively high
court fines for libel, and measures that hampered printing and
distribution of independent newspapers and magazines. In contrast to 2005,
the number of defamation suits threatening the financial viability of the
print media increased during the year. Human rights activists believed
that public officials used libel suits to prevent the publication of
embarrassing or incriminating information. Government officials publicly
stated that the accusations leveled by journalists were unfounded and
slanderous. In June, July, and August, public officials filed numerous
libel lawsuits against journalists. Courts sentenced five opposition
newspaper journalists to prison terms of between one and five years for
libel as a result of these lawsuits. For example, on July 18, the minister
of internal affairs sued Shahin Agabeyli, editor in chief of Milli Yol
newspaper for libel. A Baku court sentenced Agabeyli to one year in prison
on August 10. However, the president pardoned Agabeyli in October, and he
was released. On August 2, a senior Ministry of Internal Affairs
counternarcotics official, Hazi Aslanov, sued prominent opposition
journalist Zarusht Alizadeh for libel because Alizadeh described ministry
counternarcotic officers as drug dealers in an opposition newspaper
interview. Alizadeh was fined $5,700 (5,000 new manat). In August 2005 the government launched public television
channel ITV. In the run-up to the November 2005 parliamentary elections
the channel broadcast television debates between parliamentary candidates
and provided candidates with free airtime consistent with the requirements
of the election code. However, the OSCE election assessment reported that
government-funded ITV devoted 79 percent of its prime time news coverage
almost exclusively to positive or neutral coverage of the president,
administration, government, and ruling party. During the year OSCE media
monitors reported that ITV's programming was increasingly difficult to
distinguish from AzTV, the state television channel. Most newspapers and magazines were printed in government
publishing houses or on private printing presses owned by individuals
close to the government. The majority of independent and opposition
newspapers remained in a precarious financial position; they continued to
have problems paying wages, taxes, and periodic court fines. The government prohibited some state libraries from
subscribing to opposition newspapers. The government also continued to
prohibit state businesses from buying advertising in opposition newspapers
and pressured private business to do the same. Baku-based journalists reported that authorities in the
exclave of Nakchivan continued to block distribution of opposition
newspapers. As in the previous year, the government tightened
enforcement on unregistered, independent newspaper vendors who mainly
distributed opposition newspapers, stating that the illegal vendors
created traffic hazards on city streets. In March 2005 the government
lifted a prohibition on the sale of opposition newspapers in the subway
system. Continuing a trend from 2005, Gaya, the country's largest
independent newspaper distributor, reopened some of its 20 newsstands in
Baku that were torn down in 2002 by the Baku mayor's office. However, some
of the newsstands remain in the custody of the Baku municipal authorities.
Internet Freedom The government generally did not restrict access to the
Internet, but it required Internet service providers to be licensed and
have formal agreements with the Ministry of Communications and Information
Technologies. There was no evidence to support the widely held belief that
the government monitored Internet traffic of foreign businesses and
opposition leaders. However, in July press reports said that the
government temporarily blocked public Internet access to a Web site
popular for lampooning the president. Access to the Internet was limited
to urban centers due to lack of infrastructure. Academic Freedom and Cultural Events The government generally did not restrict academic freedom.
The opposition Musavat Party said that 40 of its members, employed as
teachers in state educational institutions in the regions were harassed
and periodically threatened with dismissal for their political activities.
University students have been threatened with expulsion for opposition
political activity. As a result, a number of students believed they would
be expelled if they were to become politically active. In May approximately 50 students from Azerbaijan Independent
University (AIU) went on hunger strike to protest the education ministry's
suspension of further matriculation at the school and at 17 other academic
institutions. Ministry officials said the suspension was part of ongoing
efforts to root out systemic corruption in the education system. However,
some analysts believed the ministry was attempting to stifle competition
against the government's premier academic institution, Baku State
University. In response to widespread media attention, the ministry
permitted fourth-year students at AIU to graduate and third-year students
to transfer to other institutions but cancelled enrollment of the first-
and second-year students. A group of the first- and second-year students
sued the ministry over the revocation of their matriculation status.
Claiming that the lawsuit was proceeding too slowly, approximately 100 to
150 of the first and second year students resumed their hunger strike in
December in the Musavat office while awaiting a court decision. The strike
ended on December 28 when Musavat officials decided not to continue
providing a space for the strikers. At year's end the court had not issued
a ruling. At the end of 2005, the government expelled four students
from Baku State University, the State Economic University, and the
Pedagogical University due to their political activities in support of
opposition parties. One expelled student, Turan Aliyev, began a hunger
strike at the end of 2005 and was joined by three opposition youth
activists in protest of the universities' expulsions. On January 17, the
minister of education intervened after local human rights activists drew
public attention to the students' case and ordered the students'
reinstatement. However, two of the students, Turan Aliyev and Namik
Faziyev, reported that university administrators continued to refuse to
grant them letters of enrollment that would allow them to return to class.
There were no government restrictions on cultural events.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The law provides for freedom of assembly; however, the
government restricted this right in practice. The government often denied
opposition political parties' requests to hold political rallies. However,
the government periodically allowed other unauthorized rallies to take
place. For example, in early February the government allowed several
unauthorized rallies of less than 100 participants in Baku and its
surrounding villages. The protests were held in response to the
publication of cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed in a Danish
newspaper. On October 16, the Baku mayor's office denied the Yox youth
group's application to hold a demonstration on October 18. On October 18,
Yox leader Ali Ismayilov said that unidentified men detained him overnight
in order to prevent him from leading an unauthorized demonstration in
Baku. In November the opposition attempted to hold five
unauthorized rallies of less than a hundred participants each, in response
to the government's lawsuit seeking to evict the PFP and several media
outlets from their central Baku offices (see section 2.a.). On four
occasions--November 2, 6, 15, and 16--police detained the opposition
protesters, who were demonstrating peacefully, and released them after
several hours. On November 23, between 60 and 70 opposition party members
attempted to protest peacefully in front of the Baku mayor's office.
Police detained between 40 and 50 of the participants. Within hours of the
detention, a Baku court fined some of the participants and sentenced 27
others to jail for between two and 15 days. In June 2005 in advance of the November 2005 parliamentary
elections, the government partially restored the constitutional right to
freedom of assembly, which had not been permitted since the demonstrations
following the 2003 presidential election. However, the government again
restricted this right in the period before the November elections. The
government interpreted the law to require individuals and political
parties to obtain permission from the authorities in order to assemble and
organize demonstrations. During the pre-election period in 2005, the government
limited political rallies to predetermined sites approved by local
authorities. Most of these locations were removed from city centers. The
opposition held authorized rallies at some of these locations and
attempted to hold unauthorized rallies in city centers. Authorities
restricted public transportation to the sites of unauthorized rallies and,
in one instance, blockaded the Azadliq bloc's local party offices to
prevent opposition members from congregating in the downtown area.
Between May and October 2005, the government deployed riot
police on multiple occasions to break up unsanctioned political rallies in
Baku, and police in several instances beat participants and journalists
covering the rallies and arrested participants. With one exception, there
was no accountability for these police abuses at year's end. Following the November 2005 parliamentary elections, the
opposition Azadliq bloc held four government-authorized rallies in Baku to
protest the election's conduct. In November 2005 security forces violently
dispersed an authorized Azadliq bloc rally in response to an opposition
leader's call for a participant "sit down" to protest election results.
Riot police charged through the crowd of 7,000 opposition supporters,
striking them with truncheons while other security forces destroyed the
platform where opposition leaders had been standing. Two opposition
leaders were struck, and police seriously beat a third opposition leader
while apprehending him. Police used truncheons and water cannons to remove
protesters from the square. Opposition officials subsequently reported
that 90 persons were seriously injured, four were taken to city emergency
rooms in critical condition, and 67 others sustained minor bruises.
Despite the peaceful conduct of participants, the government arrested 57
opposition supporters for "hooliganism" and "public disorder" at the
rally. Within hours of the arrests, courts sentenced 27 opposition
supporters to jail for 10 to 15 days; the remaining 30 were released with
administrative penalties or fines. No police officials were held
accountable for the excessive use of force. Freedom of Association The law provides for freedom of association, although in
practice the government continued to restrict this right. A number of
provisions allowed the government to regulate the activities of political
parties, religious groups, businesses, and NGOs, including a requirement
that all organizations register either with the justice ministry or the
State Committee on Work with Religious Associations (SCWRA). Although a
new law requiring the government to act on registration applications
within 30 days of receipt was implemented in 2005, vague, cumbersome, and
nontransparent registration procedures continued to result in long delays
that effectively limited citizens' right to associate. The government used a 2003 requirement for all existing NGOs
to reregister with the justice ministry to delay or deny registration to
some previously registered groups, often citing the failure of applicants
to follow proper procedures. During the year the ministry registered 548
NGOs, which it reported was more than the number registered in 2005.
However, the ministry did not provide information on the total number of
NGO applications received or the number of NGO applications rejected
during the year. In May 2005 the OSCE issued a report on NGO registration,
identifying problems and offering recommendations. Its conclusions noted
that the government procedurally evaded NGO registration by taking an
excessive amount of time to discover shortcomings, which unduly prolonged
processing times for NGO registration applications. While the report noted
many of the shortcomings in applications cited by authorities were valid,
most of them were correctable during the registration process and should
not have been grounds for final rejection. c. Freedom of Religion The constitution and law provide for freedom of religion;
however, there were some abuses and restrictions in practice. Although the
law expressly prohibits the government from interfering in the religious
activities of any individual or group, there are exceptions, including
cases where the activity of a religious group "threatens public order and
stability." In January the government announced its intention to amend the
law to restrict the political activities of religious groups. However, at
year's end parliament had not taken up consideration of a draft amendment.
The generally amicable relationship among religious groups in society
contributed to religious freedom. Most religious groups met without
government interference. A number of legal provisions enable the government to
regulate religious groups, including a requirement that religious
organizations, including individual congregations of a denomination, be
registered by the government (see section 2.b.). Muslim religious groups
must receive a letter of approval from the Caucasus Muslim Board (CMB)
before they can be registered by the State Committee on Work with
Religious Associations (SCWRA). The committee and its chairman have broad
powers over registration; control over the publication, import, and
distribution of religious literature; and the ability to suspend the
activities of religious groups violating the law. Registered Muslim organizations are subordinate to the CMB,
a Soviet-era entity that appoints Muslim clerics to mosques, periodically
monitors sermons, and organizes annual hajj pilgrimages. It has been
subject to some interference by the SCWRA, which has attempted to share
control with the CMB over the appointment and certification of clerics and
internal financial control of the country's mosques. At least one
prominent Muslim religious leader objected to interference from both the
CMB and SCWRA. The SCWRA continued to delay or deny registration to some
Protestant Christian groups, including two Baptist churches. Three of the
Baptists' five main churches successfully reregistered. However, during
the year, religious organizations reported that the registration process
had improved and that the SCWRA appeared to be handling requests more
effectively. At the end of the year, the SCWRA had registered more than
three-quarters of the number of religious communities previously
registered. The SCWRA estimated that 1,300 religious groups are in
operation, although many have not filed for registration or
reregistration. Some groups reported that SCWRA employees tried to
interfere in the internal workings of their organizations during the
registration process. Although unregistered religious groups continued to
function, some, such as Seventh-day Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses, and
Baptists, reported official harassment, including disruption of religious
services and police intimidation, fines, and occasional beatings of
worshippers by police. For example, on April 16, Baku police interrupted
the Easter services of the Protestant Community of Greater Grace,
purportedly to ascertain the legality of the group's religious activities.
However, when the group complained to the government, local officials
apologized for the incident. Local law enforcement authorities occasionally monitored
religious services, and some observant Christians and Muslims were
penalized for their religious affiliations. Christians were often
suspected of illegally proselytizing but not political activity.
Government authorities took various actions to restrict what they claimed
were political and terrorist activities by Iranian and other clerics
operating independently of the organized Muslim community. For example in
2005 the government deported several Iranian and other foreign clerics
operating independently of the organized Muslim community for alleged
violations of the law. The government outlawed several Islamic
humanitarian organizations because of credible reports about connections
to terrorist activities. Jehovah's Witnesses reported that authorities regularly
interfered with their ability to rent public halls for religious
assemblies and on occasion fined or detained and beat individuals for
meeting in private homes. Local television stations also aired "raids" of
religious meetings for "exposes" of religious groups. On December 24, police accompanied by a television crew
raided a gathering of Jehovah's Witnesses in Baku. Police detained and
released most participants, but held six foreigners in immigration
detention pending deportation proceedings. These individuals remained in
immigration detention at the end of the year. The law expressly prohibits religious proselytizing by
foreigners, and officials enforced this strictly. The Juma Mosque remained closed at the end of the year. In 2004 Ministry of Justice officials and police forcibly
evicted the Juma Mosque community from its premises following protracted
litigation. Since his 2004 conviction for participating in post election
demonstrations in 2003, the imam of the Juma Mosque, Ilgar Ibrahimoglu,
has not been allowed to travel outside the country, including to several
meetings of the UN and the OSCE where he was to be an official NGO
participant. In June 2005 a Sumgayit court ruled that a school teacher
was permitted to wear hijab in class. During the year, officials generally
permitted headscarves in schools. In November after an NGO sued the
university in court Sumgayit University officials changed a university
policy that previously prohibited students from wearing hijab. The Center
for Protection of Conscience and Freedom of Religious Persuasion reported
that authorities continued to prohibit Muslim women from wearing
headscarves in passport photos. The law permits the production and dissemination of
religious literature with the approval of the SCWRA; authorities also
appeared to selectively restrict individuals from importing and
distributing religious materials. The procedure for obtaining permission
to import religious literature remained burdensome, but religious
organizations reported that the SCWRA appeared to be handling requests
more effectively. Some religious groups continued to report that government
ministries restricted and delayed the import of religious literature,
although in other instances, the SCWRA facilitated the import of such
literature. The Baptist Union reported the SCWRA restricted the quantity
of religious books allowed after granting initial import permission.
In February 2005 the Supreme Court ruled that while the
country remained in a state of war with Armenia, the military service
requirement superseded an individual's constitutional entitlement to
alternative service due to religious beliefs and that, absent implementing
regulations, the military was not obligated to provide alternative
service. On April 28, police arrested Mushfiq Mammedov, a member of
Jehovah's Witnesses, for refusing to fulfill the mandatory military
service requirement due to his religious beliefs. According to the SCWRA,
a local court sentenced Mammedov to a suspended six-month sentence.
Societal Abuses and Discrimination There were an estimated 15,000 Jews in the country, the vast
majority located in Baku. Incidences of prejudice and discrimination
against Jews were rare, and in the few instances of anti-Semitic activity
the government responded quickly. There was popular prejudice against
Muslims who converted to non-Islamic faiths and hostility toward groups
that proselytized, particularly evangelical Christian and missionary
groups. The government appeared to encourage such social stigmatization
through orchestrated exposes and raids of nontraditional groups. The government actively undertook programs to encourage
religious tolerance. For example, on November 15, the SCWRA, foreign
affairs ministry, and Caucasus Muslim board cohosted an interfaith
tolerance conference. For a more detailed discussion, see the 2006 International
Religious Freedom Report. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation The law provides for these rights, although at times the
government limited freedom of movement, particularly for internally
displaced persons (IDPs). The law required men of draft age to register
with military officials before traveling abroad; some travel restrictions
were placed on military personnel with access to national security
information. Citizens charged with or convicted of criminal offenses and
given suspended sentences were not permitted to travel abroad. The
government employed this provision to prevent the foreign travel of an
imam who had been convicted and given a suspended sentence in 2004 (see
section 2.c.). The government refused to renew the passport of an
opposition party leader, citing an outstanding civil complaint against him
from over a decade ago. Officials regularly extracted bribes from
individuals who applied for passports. The law prohibits forced exile, and the government did not
employ it. Internally Displaced Persons IDPs were required to register their place of residence with
authorities and could live only in approved areas. This so‑called propiska
system, a carryover from the Soviet era, was imposed mainly on persons
forced from their homes after the Armenian occupation of western parts of
the country. The government asserted that registration was needed to keep
track of IDPs to provide them with assistance. While official government policy allowed ethnic Armenians to
travel, low-level officials often requested bribes or harassed Armenians
who applied for passports. According to the International Organization for
Migration (IOM), some Armenians of mixed descent reported to a local NGO
that they had problems with officials in the passport and registration
department when applying for identification cards; applicants who applied
with Azerbaijani surnames encountered no problems except for having to pay
bribes. There were approximately 675,000 IDPs in the country. The
vast majority of these persons fled their homes between 1988 and 1993 as a
result of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. During the year the government received $30 million in
assistance from international and domestic humanitarian organizations for
refugees and IDPs. According to the government, it also allocated $110
million from the country's oil fund and $100 million from the state
treasury to improve living conditions for IDPs and refugees. During the
year the government constructed new settlements under a 2004 presidential
decree to improve living conditions for refugees and IDPs. The State IDP and Refugee Committee's estimated expenditures
were $87 million. IDPs received monthly food subsidies of approximately
seven dollars (six manat) from the government. According to the IOM, in 2005 approximately 21,000 IDPs
lived in the Sabirabad, Saatli, Aghjabadi, and Barda camps. Many IDPs
lived at below-subsistence levels, without adequate food, shelter,
education, sanitation, and medical care. Approximately 28,000 IDPs lived
in settlements provided by the European Union, while another 12,000 lived
in housing provided by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR). Other IDPs were scattered among unfinished buildings (in some
cases mud dwellings), hostels, public health facilities, and the homes of
friends or relatives. Protection of Refugees The law provides for the granting of asylum and refugee
status in accordance with the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 protocol, and the government has established a
system for providing protection to some refugees through the refugee
status determination department. While the department has been progressing
in many ways, this was offset by a disappointing series of court rulings
on refugee status decisions. The courts rejected all appeals against
negative decisions on asylum claims. In practice the government provided
some protection against refoulement, the return of persons to a country
where they faced persecution, and granted refugee status or asylum during
the year. As in the preceding year, the largest number of applicants from
officially recognized populations was from Afghanistan. However, the
government did not recognize any of these individuals as refugees.
The government cooperated with the UNHCR and other
humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees and asylum seekers.
UNHCR, however, considered the government's forced return to Turkey in
October of a Turkish citizen of Kurdish ethnicity, recognized in Germany
as a refugee, as contrary to the country's obligations under the 1951 UN
convention and a clear violation of the principle of non-refoulement.
Over 90 percent of the 2,542 refugees and asylum seekers
registered by the UNHCR in the country were Chechens from the Russian
Federation. The government does not recognize Chechens as refugees as
established under the 1951 convention, and it did not accept applications
for refugee status determination from Chechens. Instead, the UNHCR
continued to carry out all functions to provide Chechens with required
assistance and protection to remain in the country. Only Chechens who registered with the UNHCR were protected
from forced repatriation to their homeland. The laws on residence,
registration, and the status of refugees and IDPs did not apply to
Chechens, who were required to register with the police and not entitled
to residence permits. Chechens were permitted to enter the country
visa-free following the March 2005 implementation of a new bilateral
external passport system with Russia. However, most Chechens could not
afford the associated costs to acquire external passports. Harassment,
detention, and arrests of undocumented Chechens occurred. According to UNHCR, several hundred Chechens sought
protection during the year, a marked decrease from previous years. Chechen
children were allowed to attend public schools. However, Chechen refugees
were often denied access to public medical services. Such assistance was
provided by UNHCR through the support of foreign donors. The government did not provide temporary protection to
individuals who may not qualify as refugees under the 1951 convention and
the 1967 protocol. However, the government accepted the UNHCR
identification card issued to Chechens. Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of
Citizens to Change Their Government The law provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully; however, the government continued to restrict this
right in practice by interfering in elections. The law also provides for
an independent legislature; however, parliament's independence was
minimal, and it exercised little legislative initiative independent of the
executive branch. Elections and Political Participation The government held national parliamentary elections in
November 2005. The OSCE's final assessment concluded that the elections
did not meet a number of the country's OSCE commitments and Council of
Europe standards for democratic elections. The OSCE concluded that the May
13 rerun elections that took place in 10 out of 125 parliamentary
constituencies showed some improvement over the November 2005 elections in
areas such as inclusive candidate registration, a largely unimpeded
campaign, and increased opportunities for domestic election observers.
However, the OSCE highlighted the need for further electoral reform,
citing continuing problems in areas including the composition of election
commissions; interference by local authorities in the electoral process;
the voting, counting, and tabulation processes; and the election grievance
process. There were numerous credible reports that local officials
interfered with the campaign process to the benefit of progovernment
candidates in the November 2005 elections and in the May partial rerun
elections. More than 500 candidates withdrew in the final weeks of the
November 2005 parliamentary election campaign; many cited government
pressure to withdraw. The government generally respected the legal provisions of
the election code. Candidates were able to hold numerous town hall
meetings with voters, although police disrupted some gatherings. According
to the OSCE, June 2005 amendments to the election code made limited
improvements to the electoral framework, although most recommendations
were not implemented or only partially implemented. The Central Election
Commission approved a number of regulations to enhance the integrity of
voting, counting, and the vote tabulation process. The Central Election
Commission undertook an extensive, pre-election voter education campaign.
In October 2005 a presidential decree reversed a ban on
election observation by NGOs receiving financial support from
international sources. The change had no impact on the 2005 parliamentary
elections, as all observers were required to have registered in advance;
however, domestic election observers were generally able to register as
individuals. There were an estimated 3,000 individual observers affiliated
with NGOs for the parliamentary elections. Voting in the November 2005 elections proceeded in a more
orderly and transparent manner than in previous national elections,
although there were some irregularities. The OSCE-led observation mission
assessed as positive 87 percent of the more than 2,500 polling stations it
visited during the daytime voting process. However, in some instances,
international observers reported unauthorized persons, such as police
officers, in the polling station during the voting. Observers also
witnessed candidates or candidate representatives attempting to influence
voter choices and ballot box stuffing in one-third of the polling stations
visited as well as family (group) voting in one-fifth of the polling
stations visited. Fraud and major irregularities marred the vote counting and
tabulation process. International observers assessed the ballot counting
process as bad or very bad in 43 percent of polling stations observed,
reporting that election precinct officials refused to count election
ballots in front of them and attempted to complete official tabulation
protocols behind closed doors. In one precinct, observers witnessed
election commission members taking instructions from an unidentified
person in the polling station's basement. Precinct-level voting results
were not posted in 54 percent of the counts observed. Following the November 2005 elections, authorities acted to
address some instances of election fraud. The Central Election Commission
annulled results from 423 of more than 5,100 election precincts. President
Aliyev dismissed three local executive authorities because of their
interference in the campaign and voting process. The prosecutor general
opened 17 criminal cases against local government officials, election
commission members, and opposition candidates for violations of the
election code on voting day, resulting in 10 convictions. The prosecutor
also ordered the arrest of four local election officials for election
fraud; they were convicted of election misconduct and sentenced to prison
during the year. The Central Election Commission annulled four
constituency results and ordered reruns of these races that were held in
May. The commission overturned the results of two other constituencies in
favor of opposition candidates because of serious precinct irregularities
and dismissed the election commission members of these six constituencies
citing the members' involvement in fraud or failure to follow election
procedures. The Central Election Commission also dismissed 108
precinct-level election commissions and six constituency commissions on
fraud-related grounds. In a December 2005 hearing to certify the election results,
the Constitutional Court annulled the results of an additional six
constituencies, bringing to 10 the total number of annulled constituencies
that were rerun on May 13; however, the six additional annulments also
included the court's reversal of previous CEC decisions. Opposition
supporters criticized the court's action because it cancelled a race
previously awarded to an opposition Azadliq bloc candidate as well as a
race that Azadliq claimed it had won in a fair contest. The Central Election Commission and Constitutional Court
actions did not fully address reports of fraud and other irregularities or
allay the concerns of the international community about the extent to
which the results fully reflected the will of the people. One opposition member refused to take her seat in protest of
election fraud, and the government did not set a date for a by-election
during the year. The most recent presidential election was held in October
2003 and formally brought Ilham Aliyev to power. This election failed to
meet international standards for democratic elections due to a number of
serious irregularities. On October 6, the authorities held partial municipal
elections around the country. The opposition Azadliq bloc, comprised of
the PFP, ADP, and Azerbaijan Liberal Party, boycotted the municipal
elections, asserting that the composition of local election commissions
made the elections inherently unfair. Some of these municipal elections
were reruns of 2004 municipal elections, which election authorities
cancelled because of widespread fraud and irregularities. Opposition parties played an active role in politics.
However, members of the opposition were more likely to experience official
harassment and arbitrary arrest and detention than other citizens. On
November 24, the State Economic Court evicted the opposition PFP and
several media outlets from their office building in central Baku. The
government assigned the party to the second floor of a building in
deplorable condition on the outskirts of the city. The party refused to
occupy the premises and instead continued to work out of space temporarily
provided by the ADP. Police officials had not allowed PFP members to
retrieve their property and effects from the newly assigned office space
at year's end (see section 2.a). The government refused to renew the passport of PFP Chairman
Ali Kerimli citing an outstanding civil complaint from 1993. Human rights
activists criticized the action, noting that the government had renewed
Kerimli's passport on several occasions in the intervening years without
objection. Progovernment news agencies attacked Kerimli and his party
in daily news broadcasts in 2005, inciting several violent protests
outside of the PFP's offices. There were 14 women in the 125-seat parliament. Several
women held senior government positions, including deputy speaker of
parliament and deputy chair of the Central Election Commission. There were
no legal restrictions on the participation of women in politics, although
traditional social norms limited women's political roles, and they were
underrepresented in elective offices. Ethnic minorities such as the Lezghins, Talysh, and Avars
continued to serve in parliament and in government. Government Corruption and Transparency The law penalizes corruption by outlawing bribery; however,
there was widespread public perception of corruption throughout all facets
of society, including the civil service, government ministries, and the
highest levels of government. The NGO Transparency International reported
that the country received a rating of 2.4 on its corruption perceptions
index, indicating there was a perception of serious corruption. According
to the prosecutor general's office, criminal cases related to corruption
were opened during the year, specifically on bribery charges; however,
these cases had little or no impact on the prevalence of bribery and
corruption in the country. In January 2005 a new anticorruption law came into force
that required public officials to report annual income, sources of income,
property owned, and financial liabilities. It also prohibited nepotism and
limited giving gifts and direct or indirect financial benefits to public
officials or third parties; government officials acknowledged that
implementation of this law was slow and halting. The law provides for public access to government information
by individuals and organizations; however, the government often did not
provide access. Although government ministries have separate procedures on
how to request information, they routinely denied requests, claiming not
to possess the information. Individuals have the right to appeal the
denials in court; however, the courts generally upheld the decisions of
the ministries. Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights A number of domestic and international human rights groups
generally operated without government restriction, investigating and
publishing their findings on human rights cases. Although the government
maintained ties with some human rights NGOs and responded to their
inquiries, on occasion the government criticized and intimidated other
human rights NGOs and activists. The Ministry of Justice routinely denied
or failed to register some human rights NGOs. The major local human rights NGOs were the Association for
the Protection of Women's Rights, the Bureau of Human Rights and Respect
for the Law, the Azerbaijan Foundation of Democracy Development and Human
Rights Protection, Azerbaijani Committee Against Torture, the Institute
for Peace and Democracy, and the Human Rights Center of Azerbaijan. Most
of the leading NGOs affiliated themselves with one of two independent,
umbrella organizations: the Human Rights Federation or the Helsinki
Citizens Assembly. The government met with a variety of domestic NGO monitors.
In 2005 the ministry of justice formed a joint prison-monitoring
commission with several representatives of the NGO community (see section
1.c.). The ministry also formed a joint political prisoner review
committee with several representatives of the human rights community in
2005. In August 2005 the ministry of internal affairs granted permission
for the first time for an NGO to have immediate access to police and
pretrial detention facilities; the NGO exercised this right without
obstruction. Several NGOs reported that the government and police at
times refused to protect them from so-called provocateurs who threatened,
harassed, and attacked NGO activists and vandalized their property. Arzu
Abdullayeva director of the Helsinki Citizens Assembly received several
threats in connection with her leadership of an NGO delegation's
fact-finding visit to Nagorno-Karabakh in July. The registration process for NGOs remained cumbersome and
included requirements to register grants from foreign entities. NGO grants
from foreign entities are subject to a social security tax of 22 percent
on employee salaries, although grants from a few countries with bilateral
agreements with the government were subject to only a 2 percent tax. NGO
activists reported that these provisions inhibited their organizations'
activities. The government generally permitted visits by UN
representatives and other international organizations such as the ICRC.
International NGOs, such as Human Rights Watch and Reporters Without
Borders, generally operated without government hindrance. Citizens may appeal violations committed by the state or by
individuals to the ombudswoman for human rights. No information was
available at year's end regarding the complaints received during the year
by the ombudswoman. In 2005 her office received 6,200 complaints and
accepted 3,000 for investigation as authentic human rights violations. The
ombudswoman may refuse to accept cases of abuse that occurred over a year
ago, anonymous complaints, and cases already being handled by the
judiciary. The ombudswoman traveled around the country to hear human
rights complaints, cooperated with foreign diplomats working on human
rights activities, and submitted an annual report to parliament. Compared
with previous years, the ombudswoman was more outspoken in her criticism
of government actions. For example, the ombudswoman spoke out against the
NTRC's November decision to order ANS Television and Radio off the air
(see section 2.a.). However, local human rights NGOs and activists
criticized the ombudswoman's work as ineffective and generally regarded
her as not independent of the government. The parliament and ministry of justice also had human rights
offices that heard complaints, conducted investigations, and made
recommendations to relevant government bodies. Officials of the human
rights office within the ministry of foreign affairs regularly met with
the diplomatic community to discuss issues of concern. The parliament's
human rights body did not operate fully independently of government
influence. On December 28, President Aliyev issued a decree announcing
a new National Action Plan for the Protection of Human Rights aimed at
improving Azerbaijan's human rights performance. The deputy prime minister
and presidential administration were assigned oversight responsibility.
Section 5 Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking
in Persons The law provides for equal rights without respect to gender,
race, language, disability, or social status, but the government did not
always respect these provisions or effectively enforce them. Violence and
discrimination against women, trafficking of persons, and discrimination
against ethnic Armenians were problems. Women Violence against women, including domestic violence,
continued to be a problem. In rural areas, women had no effective recourse
against assaults by their husbands or others; there are no laws on spousal
abuse or specific laws on spousal rape. Rape is illegal and carries a
maximum 15-year prison sentence. The government stated that 32 rapes and
attempted rapes were reported during the year. Most rape victims
reportedly knew their assailants but did not report incidents out of fear
and shame. There were no government-sponsored programs for victims of
domestic violence or rape. In Baku a women's crisis center operated by the
Institute for Peace and Democracy provided free medical, psychological,
and legal assistance for women. During the year the center provided
services to 4,734 women, and 1,850 women called the center's crisis hot
line. The institute also broadcast three public service announcements and
short films in the regions, covering women's legal rights and court
procedures. Prostitution is an administrative offense rather than a
crime and is punishable by a fine of up to $100 (88 manat). Pimps and
brothel owners may be sentenced to prison for up to six years.
Prostitution was a serious problem, particularly in Baku. Trafficking in women for sexual exploitation was a problem
(see section 5, Trafficking). Sexual harassment was prohibited by law, and the government
reported that it investigated cases of sexual harassment during the year.
At year's end, the government had not released data on the number of cases
it investigated during the year. Women nominally enjoy the same legal rights as men; however,
societal discrimination was a problem. Traditional social norms and poor
economic conditions continued to restrict women's roles in the economy,
and there were reports that women had difficulty exercising their legal
rights due to gender discrimination. Women were underrepresented in
high-level jobs, including top business positions. Children The law requires the government to protect the rights of
children with regard to education and health care. In practice government
programs provided a low standard of education and health care for
children. Public education was compulsory, free, and universal until
the age of 17. The Ministry of Education reported 100 percent elementary
school attendance, 97 percent middle school attendance, and 88 percent
high school attendance during the year; the UN Children's Fund reported
the elementary school figure was approximately 88 percent. The highest
level of education achieved by the majority of children was high school.
In impoverished rural areas, large families sometimes placed a higher
priority on the education of male children and kept girls to work in the
home. Some poor families forced their children to beg rather than attend
school (see section 6.d.). The government provided a minimum standard of health care
for children, but the overall quality of medical care was very low. During
the year, the government began undertaking health sector reforms aimed at
improving the low quality of care. There were isolated reports of child abuse and of
trafficking in children (see section 5, Trafficking), and during the year
the government reported that it opened an investigation into 11 cases of
child trafficking. Child marriage was not considered a significant problem,
although evidence suggested it was growing, primarily in rural central and
southern regions among poor families. A large number of refugee and IDP children lived in
substandard conditions in camps and public buildings. In some cases these
children were unable to attend school. Trafficking in Persons In 2005 the government adopted new legislation and
amendments to the criminal code criminalizing trafficking in persons.
During the year 190 traffickers were prosecuted under the new law. In
addition the government prosecuted traffickers under other laws including
those prohibiting rape, forced prostitution and labor, and forgery of
travel documents. Most trafficking-related crimes prosecuted during the
year carried maximum penalties between five and twelve years'
imprisonment, except for rape and sexual violence, which both carried
maximum 15-year prison sentences. There also are specific criminal
penalties for enslaving, raping, and forcing children into prostitution.
During the year the government opened 186 criminal investigations
resulting in 190 convictions of individuals charged with
trafficking-related crimes. The deputy minister of internal affairs was the national
coordinator for government antitrafficking activities, monitoring relevant
government bodies' efforts and dealing with the NGO community. Government
bodies involved in antitrafficking included the ministries of internal
affairs, foreign affairs, justice, national security, and health; the
prosecutor general; the state border guard; customs; and the State
Committee on Women's and Children's Issues. In August the president
announced a restructuring of the ministry of internal affairs, which
created a separate antitrafficking unit. The government regularly collaborated with neighboring
countries on antitrafficking investigations. The country was primarily a country of origin and transit
for trafficked women, men, and children for sexual exploitation and forced
labor. Central Asian and local women and girls were trafficked from or
through the country to the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Iran, India, and
Pakistan for work in the sex industry. There was also some internal
trafficking of women for sexual exploitation. The government reported it
identified 77 trafficking victims. During the year the government also
reported 11 cases of child trafficking. Women and girls were trafficked internally from rural areas
to urban centers for sexual exploitation, men were trafficked to Turkey
and Russia for forced labor, and children were trafficked internally for
begging. Iranians, Iraqis, Afghans, and migrants from South Asia were
smuggled through the country to Europe--particularly Germany, Sweden,
France, and the Netherlands--and to the US, where they at times had their
passports confiscated and were subjected to forced labor. Traffickers
generally targeted women. Traffickers were either foreigners or ethnic Azerbaijanis
who acted in loose concert with international networks. They approached
victims directly and indirectly through friends and relatives, usually
offering to arrange employment abroad. Traffickers also used deceptive
newspaper advertisements offering false work abroad. Traffickers
reportedly used forged documents to move victims. They also used
fraudulent marriage proposals from men posing as Iranian businessmen to
lure women into prostitution in neighboring Iran. Despite such fraud, some
families willingly married their daughters to wealthy Iranians without
concern for the actual outcome. There was no evidence of official complicity in trafficking,
but corruption in some government agencies facilitated trafficking.
In 2005 parliament passed antitrafficking legislation
increasing protections for trafficking victims by relieving them from
civil, administrative, and criminal responsibility for offenses committed
under coercion, intimidation, or other trafficking conditions. The law
also allows the use of pseudonyms to protect the identity of trafficking
victims and provides for assistance and shelters for trafficking victims.
Subsequent revisions to the criminal code implemented this legislation.
There was no standardized mechanism to return trafficked
women to the country. According to the IOM, some Azerbaijanis and third
country nationals who were either victims of trafficking or engaged in
prostitution were deported to the country, primarily from Turkey. However,
the government had no program to assist them. The government informally referred some victims to state
health care facilities; these facilities lacked the capacity to provide
the required specialized treatment or information for victims of
trafficking. The government also referred some victims to international
organizations and domestic NGOs for assistance. Some NGOs, which
cooperated with the government, reportedly sheltered victims in private
homes, due to a lack, for most of the year, of adequate shelters available
for trafficking victims in the country. IOM conducted training for shelter
volunteers, as well as training for volunteers to staff an NGO
antitrafficking hotline, which has yet to open. During the year the government continued to implement its
antitrafficking action plan. The government completed renovations to the
building designated last year to be a shelter for trafficking victims,
which was officially opened in October. The government also designated a
number for a trafficking hotline which will be accessible toll-free both
domestically and internationally once it is operational. The government
implemented a standardized recruitment, selection, and testing process for
police officers of the new antitrafficking unit developed last year with
international assistance. However, it was not possible to determine
whether this process conformed to international standards. Several NGOs, such as the Insti |